Journal of Accounting and Taxation
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Article Number - 9D2F0191269

Vol.5(2), pp. 27-37 , July 2013
ISSN: 2141-6664

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The contextual framework of corporate income tax evasion

Paula Fukofuka
  • Paula Fukofuka
  • School of Business Administration, South China University of Technology, Wuhan, Tianhe District, Guangzhou, P.R. China 510640.
  • Google Scholar

 Accepted: 25 June 2013  Published: 31 July 2013

Copyright © 2013 Author(s) retain the copyright of this article.
This article is published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0

The Portfolio Investment Framework, the Principal Agent Framework and the Principal Two Agents Framework of tax evasion, individually or collectively, are inadequate to represent fairly the dynamics of corporate income tax evasion. These behavior based frameworks are for the prediction of tax evasion and their usefulness for identifying tax evasion is limited. To bridge the gap between the prediction and the identification aspects of corporate income tax evasion, this paper presents the Contextual Framework of Corporate Income Tax Evasion, structured with twelve ideas and thirty five dynamics to guide and direct future research. With a simple game theory model, the paper promotes the tax audit cut-off policy that incorporates a reward program for the agent of government, ensures audit frequency and tests independence of the agent from governance.


Key words: Portfolio Investment Framework, Principle Agent Framework, Principle Two Agent Framework, Tax Evasion, Corporate Income Tax Evasion.


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APA (2013). The contextual framework of corporate income tax evasion. Journal of Accounting and Taxation, 5(2), 27-37.
Chicago Paula Fukofuka. "The contextual framework of corporate income tax evasion." Journal of Accounting and Taxation 5, no. 2 (2013): 27-37.
MLA Paula Fukofuka. "The contextual framework of corporate income tax evasion." Journal of Accounting and Taxation 5.2 (2013): 27-37.

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