

## Article

# The impact of human rights NGO activity on human right practices

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**Do large numbers of human rights international non-governmental organizations correlate with high governmental respect for human rights? Moreover, do the activities of these organizations with members within a country lead to improvements in the human rights practices within a state? This paper uses new data to provide the first large scale empirical test of the effects of these organizations on human rights practices. It finds that human rights international non-governmental organizations can have an important impact on human rights practices, even after accounting for general levels of overall civil society.**

**Key words:** INGOs, human rights, non-profits.

## RESEARCH QUESTION

Although there has been a plethora of qualitative studies and theoretical inquiries that indicate that human rights international non-governmental organizations (human rights INGOs or, as used hereafter, HROs) are the critical link to improvement in human rights practices within a state, there are no quantitative, large-N analyses to support these claims.<sup>1</sup>

Do large numbers of HROs correlate with high governmental respect for human rights? Moreover, do the activities of HROs with members within a state lead to improvements in the human rights practices within a state? The relationship between changes in the number of human rights international non-governmental organizations with members within a state and the human rights practices of the state over time was examined. This research is an important first step in empirically linking HROs to improvements in human rights practices. Additionally, once this link is quantified, research can continue into how different “strategies, tactics, and

organizational attributes” of HROs relate to their effectiveness in improving human rights practices (Cingranelli and Richards, 2001: 225).

## DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES AND LITERATURE

Two distinct theoretical literatures that have not been connected until very recently were drawn: (1) human rights practices and (2) NGO activities (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005).<sup>2</sup>

### Theory on human rights practices

To begin, it is important to make the distinction between *de jure* human rights protection and *de facto* human rights practices. Most states will not come out as “anti-human rights;” in fact, recent studies have concluded that is institutionalized in rules and organizations, commonly in

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<sup>1</sup> An NGO is minimally defined as any non-profit, open membership, transparent, and legal organization. This is the definition agreed to in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, the standard reference on NGOs and international organizations (IOs). To this minimal definition, however, the focus here will be on organizations involved in at least 3 states and interested and concerned with policy change and performance related to the hypothetical meta-goal of a world in which there are no human rights violations (Blitt 2004).

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<sup>2</sup> Though this research is concerned with HROs as a subset of NGOs, I will draw upon the wider theoretical literature concerning all NGOs. My theoretical basis for drawing upon this wider literature is the numerous case studies of HROs that conclude that HROs in practice draw upon the strategies, activities, and theories concerning all other type of NGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998). A good example of this is the lessons learned from the success of the environmental movement in the 1970s; Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch adopted some of the strategies of these environmental NGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Welsch 2001; Korey 1998; Clark 2001).

even the signing of human rights treaties has little impact on actual human rights practices within a state (Landman, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005; Hathaway, 2002). Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005) call this dichotomy the “paradox of empty promises” and contend that states ratify human rights treaties as “window dressings” without effectively working to promote the policies outlined in the treaties. Though the factors that impact the signing of human rights treaties are interesting and in many instances, overlap the factors that impact human rights practices, This research work focus on the factors that are related to human rights practices *de facto*.

Previous research has found many factors that influence human right practices: economic development and growth (Mitchell and McCormick, 1988; Henderson, 1991; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Richards et al., 2001), foreign economic penetration (Richards et al., 2001), domestic conflict (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999; Richards et al., 2001), interstate conflict (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999; Richards et al., 2001), population size (Henderson, 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999; Richards, 2001; Richards et al., 2001), and level of democracy (Henderson, 1991:1993; Poe and Tate, 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996; Poe et al., 1999; Cingranelli and Richards, 1999). Additionally, research in the last year has focused on linkages between the global civil society and human rights practices, measured as the level of overall international NGO activity (Landman, 2005), levels of international organizations generally and level of Human Rights international organizations specifically (Tsutsui and Min Wotipka, 2004).

### Theory of HRO activities

The interdisciplinary literature on the role of HROs either focuses on the ways in which individual HROs work to achieve the meta-goal or on how HROs operate collectively within the civil society. There are two micro processes that appear in the literature for how individual HROs work: the spread of economic resources and the spread of norms (Poe and Tate, 1999; Richards et al., 2001; Van Tuijl, 1999; Welch, 2001; Feldman, 1997). The economic resources approach focuses on how HRO “agenda setting” and “shaming and blaming” can be linked to monetary assistance and aid, which can further perpetuate either the human rights improvements or abuses (Cingranelli and Richards, 1999; Curran and Wherry, 2003; Richards et al., 2001).

As to the normative approach, “norm entrepreneurs” use organizational platforms to try to persuade governments to adopt a norm through “framing” and the “logic of appropriateness” (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Korey, 1998). At this point, the norm usually NGOs (2001: 900). After the norm has been adopted by a critical mass of states, there is a process of international

socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001)<sup>3</sup>.

At the collective level, NGOs form the central link in civil society’s push for human rights. For example, Forsyth contends that globalization has led to “the consolidation of networks of activists, the convergence of strategies, and the global sharing of information and resources” (2000: 180). These networks, usually referred to as transnational advocacy networks (TAN), work within a “boomerang pattern” of international and domestic ties and feedback loops between NGOs, local social movements, foundations, the media, churches, intellectuals, parts of intergovernmental organizations and branches of governments (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 9)<sup>4</sup>. As Keck and Sikkink (1999) point out, “initial research suggests that international and domestic non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a central role in most advocacy networks” (92). In fact, most TAN literature centers on NGO development and activities (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Henderson, 2002; Hudson, 2001; Jordan and Van Tuijl, 2000).

Despite this central importance of NGOs in the TAN, global society, and human rights literature, to date, there have been only two very recent large-N studies that focused on connections between changes in the number of all types of NGO and changes in human rights practices (Landman, 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). These studies dealt more on the growth of civil society in general and not specifically on the relationship between HRO growth and improvements in human rights practices<sup>5</sup>.

### Hypothesis

After reviewing the qualitative research and theoretical arguments on the effectiveness of HROs, thus, it becomes evident that future research needs to focus on large scale assessments of the impact of HRO activities on human rights performance. However, there is a potential problem with endogeneity in this research: political liberalization would lead to a relaxation of restrictions of the activities of HROs and thus their proliferation. At the same time, the activities of HROs should lead to their proliferation. Seeing the presence of large numbers of HROs and political liberalization could

<sup>3</sup>Socialization of norms is achieved through peer-pressure: blaming, shaming, and praising the behavior associated with the norm (Ron 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tsutsui and Min Wotipka 2004; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005).

<sup>4</sup>Though transnational advocacy networks are usually thought of as a positive thing in the literature, Brysk, for example, points out that there is a flip side to a global civil society. The same globalization processes and information technology that connects human rights organizations can bring together groups of individuals wanting to abuse human rights and can connect groups aimed at harming minorities (2002: 243-244).

<sup>5</sup> Likewise, little attention was paid to the endogeneity problem inherent in this research.

imply that the former, the latter, or both are driving the behavior. This research seek to deal with this endogeneity by: (1) Focusing on change rather than levels of HRO memberships and (2) Lagging the measure of HRO activity in statistical analysis<sup>6</sup>. Parsing out the relationship between HRO growth and improvements in human rights practices moves beyond the global civil society literature and addresses the TAN literature and the effectiveness of HROs in bringing improvements in governmental human rights practices.

Therefore, my research hypothesis is as follows:

"If the number of HROs with members within a state increases, the human rights empowerment index scores of the state will also increase".

## RESEARCH DESIGN

A panel analysis dataset to examine the link between HRO memberships and improvements in human rights was constructed. As stated in the hypothesis, this research is interested in the relationship between the number of HROs with members within a given country and changes in that country's human rights empowerment index score over time.

### Unit of observation and sample

In order to understand changes over time, three points in time was looked at: 1978, 1988, and 1998. These time periods are chosen because of the use of the HRO dataset of Tsutsui and Min Wotipka (2004), which only sampled HROs in 1978, 1988, and 1998. Likewise, their dataset is a sample of 148 to 151 countries; the same countries were utilize in this research. When combined with the CIRI human rights empowerment index score dataset, however, the sample dropped to around 100 countries.

### Dependent variable

The dependent variable is the CIRI Human Rights Empowerment Index Score (Cingranelli and Richards, 2004). The Empowerment Rights Index score is a compilation of scores relating to "freedom of movement, freedom of

speech, worker's rights, political participation, and freedom of religion indicators" (Cingranelli and Richards, 2004). Values of the CIRI empowerment index range from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating no governmental respect for the empowerment rights and 10 indicating full governmental respect for these rights. Cingranelli-Richards scores based on the yearly reports of governmental human rights practices from the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International's annual Reports for each country (Cingranelli and Richards, 2004).

Additionally, the dependent variable used in portions of this analysis is Change in Human Rights Empowerment Index Scores. This variable was calculated by subtracting the past index score from the current index score. This model specification is discussed in detail below.

One problem with the use of the CIRI Empowerment Index scale, however, is that it does not extend prior to 1981. Therefore, for portions of this analysis where the CIRI Empowerment Index score is needed for 1978, the value at 1981 was substituted for. The summarized statistics of this variable can be found in Tables 1 - 3. Additionally, Figures 1 - 3 describe the summary distributions for this variable.

### Key independent variable

The key independent variable is the Number of HROs in 1978, 1988, and 1998 with members in a particular country and the Changes in these numbers from 1978 to 1988 and 1988 to 1998. This data was obtained from Tsutsui and Min Wotipka who utilized the data as the dependent variable in their 2004 *Social Forces* article entitled "Global Civil Society and the International Human Rights Movement: Citizen Participation in Human Rights International Non-governmental Organizations." Following their previous control for heteroskedasity, the square root of this number was used in this analysis (Tsutsui and Min Wotipka, 2004). The summarized statistics for this variable are also found in Tables 1-3.

### Controls

As mentioned in the literature review on human rights practices, there are many potential control variables that need to be accounted for in this research. All control variables are operationalized consistent with previous research. As to economic development, following the standard of Mitchell and McCormick (1988), the natural log of GNP Per Capita, in constant US dollars was used (World Development Indicators, 2005). Change in GNP Per Capita was calculated as Percent Increase for Past 10 years of GDP Per Capita. Trade Openness was measured as trade in goods as a percentage of GDP which came from the World Development Indicators(2005). As to domestic and interstate conflict, the coding guidelines that

<sup>6</sup> This follows the same research design as following the same research design as Curran and Wherry did in a working paper entitled "Do Transnational Organizations Promote Civil and Political Liberties? Cross-National Evidence from Southeast Asia, 1978-2002." Curran and Wherry lag their measures of transnational organizations by 1 year and control for foreign direct investment, GDP per capita, and urbanization.

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics for 1978.

Variables	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value	No. of observations
CIRI empowerment index (1981)	5.328	3.116	0	10	134
PTS amnesty †	2.988	.968	1	5	81
PTS state department †	4.192	.837	1	5	104
HRO (square root)	3.169	1.572	0	6.708	148
Democracy	-1.859	7.511	-10	10	128
British colonial history	.380	.487	0	1	163
Leftist regime history	.202	.403	0	1	163
Foreign direct investment (logged)	17.460	1.910	12.618	21.356	80
Population total (logged)	15.235	1.903	10.687	20.678	159
Civil war	0.052	0.022	0	1	155
International war	.071	.258	0	1	155
INGOs (logged)	5.023	1.656	0.12	7.73	146
GDP per capita (US constant) (logged)	7.518	1.544	4.865	10.516	119
Trade openness (logged)	3.868	.630	2.336	5.690	117

† The PTS scales have been reversed to reflect the scale of the CIRI Index (0 = bad score, 10 = full respect).


**Table 2.** Descriptive statistics for 1988.

Variable Name	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value	No. of observations
CIRI Empowerment Index (1988)	5.328	3.116	0	10	134
Δ CIRI Empowerment Index (from 1981 to 1991)	.843	3.087	-6	9	127
PTS Amnesty†	3.319	1.041	1	5	119
Δ PTS Amnesty (from 1978 to 1988)	.161	1.089	-2	4	81
PTS State Department†	3.718	1.157	1	5	142
Δ PTS State Department (from 1978 to 1988)	-.475	.938	-4	2	103
HRO (square root)	4.394	1.909	0	8.944	151
Δ HRO (square root) (from 1978 to 1988)	3.213	1.243	1	6.164	135
Democracy	-.891	7.807	-10	10	128
Δ Democracy (from 1978 to 1988)	.969	4.697	-12	17	128
British Colonial History	.380	.487	0	1	163
Leftist Regime History	.215	.412	0	1	163
Foreign Direct Investment (logged)	17.732	2.559	10.260	24.285	87
Δ FDI (logged) (from 1978 to 1988)	.625	1.350	-3.100	3.387	63
Population Total (logged)	15.342	1.900	10.653	20.821	160
% Increase for Past 10 years in Pop	.234	.77	-.034	1.21	159
Civil War	.122	.328	0	1	156
Δ Civil War (from 1978 to 1988)	.071	.304	-1	1	155
International War	.057	.234	0	1	156
Δ International War (from 1978 to 1988)	-.013	.227	-1	1	155
INGOs (logged)	5.746	1.158	1.98	7.68	146
Δ INGOs (logged)(from 1978 to 1988)	.703	.877	-4.48	2.78	146
GDP Per Capita (US constant) (logged)	7.421	1.527	4.601	10347	151
% Increase for Past 10 years of GDP percap	.120	.303	-.530	1.264	118
Trade Openness (logged)	3.815	.594	2.347	5.794	145
ΔTrade Openness (logged) (from 1978 to 1988)	-.0834	.356	-1.210	1.025	115

† The PTS Scales have been reversed to reflect the scale of the CIRI Index (0 = bad score, 10 = full respect).

**Table 3.** Descriptive statistics for 1998.

Variable Name	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum value	Maximum value	No. of observations
CIRI Empowerment Index	6.44	3.442	0	10	150
Δ CIRI Empowerment Index (from 1988 to 1998)	.648	3.016	-6	9	128
PTS Amnesty†	3.151	1.132	1	5	119
Δ PTS Amnesty (from 1988 to 1998)	-.216	1.068	-3	3	102
PTS State Department†	3.567	1.243	1	5	155
Δ PTS State Department (from 1988 to 1998)	-.137	1.019	-4	2	140
HRO(square root)	6.444	2.400	1.732	12.570	151
Δ HRO (square root) (from 1988 to 1998)	4.601	1.766	0	8.883	150
Democracy	2.710	6.721	-10	10	138
Δ Democracy (from 1988 to 1998)	3.464	5.484	-14	17	125
British Colonial History	.388	.489	0	1	160
Leftist Regime History	.2	.402	0	1	160
Foreign Direct Investment (logged)	19.433	2.182	11.795	24.440	102
Δ FDI (logged) (from 1988 to 1998)	1.531	1.500	-2.003	5.235	61
Population Total (logged)	15.582	1.903	10.600	20.940	159
% Increase for Past 10 years in Pop	.194	.145	-.113	.787	159
Civil War	.084	.278	0	1	154
Δ Civil War (from 1978 to 1988)	-.039	.301	-1	1	153
International War	.045	.208	0	1	154
Δ International War (from 1978 to 1988)	-.013	.281	-1	1	153
INGOs (logged)	6.133	1.089	3.08	8..13	152
Δ INGOs (logged)(from 1988 to 1998)	.412	3.80	-1.84	1.77	146
GDP Per Capita (US constant) (logged)	7.451	1.583	4.559	10.573	170
% Increase for Past 10 years of GDP percap.	.124	.343	-.762	2.033	151
Trade Openness (logged)	4.018	.523	2.652	5.554	170
ΔTrade Openness (logged) (from 1988 to 1998)	.160	.390	-1.258	1.712	143







Figure 2. CIRI empowerment scores in 1988.



began with Small and Singer (1982) was followed and a dichotomous variable for the presence or absence of absence of International War and Civil War<sup>7</sup>.

For population size, the natural logarithm of total national population of the years in question and the Percent Increase for Past 10 Years in Total National Population (World Development Index, 2005) was used. Data on the level of Democracy came from POLITY IV and is a score from -10 (most autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). Following common practice, countries that were coded as a -66, -77, or -88 in the POLITY IV were given as score of 0 (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Additionally, following the standard set by Poe and Tate (1994), there is a control for whether the country was a former British Colony (1 = former British Colony, 0 = no British Colonial history) or Leftist Regime (1 = former Leftist Regime, 0 = no Leftist Regime history). The summarized statistics for these variables are also found in Tables 1 -3.

## STATISTICAL METHOD

The ordered categorical nature of the dependent variable, ordered Probit analysis was performed.<sup>8</sup> Four separate models were constructed to measure the level and changes in levels in the independent and dependent variables during the 1978 to 1998 time period. A brief outline of each of these models is stated as follows:

### Model 1

The dependent variable in this model is the CIRI Human Rights Empowerment Index Score in 1988. The independent variables are all lagged, measured first as levels in 1978 and then change from 1978 to 1988 (subtracting the 1978 score from the 1988 score).

### Model 2

The dependent variable in this model is the CIRI Human Rights Empowerment Index Score in 1998. The independent variables are all lagged, measured first as levels in 1988 and then change from 1988 to 1998 (subtracting the 1988 score from the 1998 score).

### Model 3

The dependent variable in this model is Change in Human Rights Empowerment Index Scores from 1981 to 1991 (subtract the 1981 score from the 1991 score). As mentioned earlier, the use of the

1981 and 1991 figures, though not ideal, allows the utilization of the CIRI scale despite data limitations. The independent variables are all measured at their levels in 1978.

### Model 4

The dependent variable in this model is Change in Human Rights Empowerment Index Scores from 1988 to 1998 (subtract the 1988 score from the 1998 score). The independent variables are all measured at their levels in 1988.

## RESULTS

This hypothesis is supported in three of the four models and the models all fit the minimum standard of accuracy, meeting a minimum goodness of fit to the population ( $\text{Prob} > \chi^2$  is less than 0.05). However, multicollinearity is an issue in some of the models, indicating the need for further data collection and testing. Additionally,

This hypothesis is largely not supported when the PTS scales are substituted in for the CIRI scale as the dependent variable in the models and is also not largely supported in the models with the addition of regional fixed effects.

### Original models

Tables 4 - 6 shows the ordered probit estimates of the original models. Before evaluating these figures, however, it is important to note that problems with multicollinearity may be influencing the estimates in all models where the independent variables are measured at levels in a particular year (Model 1-levels, Model 2-levels, Model 3, and Model 4). When the auxiliary regressions of the key independent variable was run (Square root of number of HROs), against all the other independent variables in these models, the adjusted  $R^2$  was 0.55 in 1978 and 0.64 in 1988, indicating serious problems with multicollinearity. Correlations between the independent variables, however, were no larger than 0.61 between the square root of the Number of HROs and Population Size (logged). Other high correlations with Number of HROs were Democracy (0.55) and GDP Per Capita (0.54). No other correlations were above 0.40. These moderately strong correlations and high auxiliary  $R^2$  suggests that multicollinearity is a problem. As a result, standard errors may be inflated, leading to inefficiency. However, the key independent variable is still statistically significant in these models and there is not a perfect multicollinearity, indicating that the problem is worrisome but not fatal to the models.

Additionally, the auxiliary regressions of the key independent variable against all other independent variables in Model 1-change and Model 2- change had

<sup>7</sup> This data came from the COW dataset of international and civil conflict. This dataset only extended to 1997, however; I extended the dataset to 1998 for my analysis.

<sup>8</sup> Based on the number of ordered categories in the dependent variable, the models were also ran as OLS regression in order to check for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (both which were not present in any of the original models or the robustness checks). These regression results are not included, however, because of the prediction of negative out-of-bound values of the dependent variable when using CLARIFY for all of the models (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

adjusted R<sup>2</sup>s of less than 0.40 and no correlations higher than 0.25. Also, as mentioned in the research design, all  
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**Table 4.** Model 1 - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI empowerment human rights index scores in 1988.

<b>Independent variables</b>	<b>Independent variables-levels (1978)</b>	<b>Independent variables-change (from 1978 to 1988)</b>
HRO membership (square root)	0.572** (0.137)	0.438** (0.126)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.198 (0.461)	0.007 (0.008)
Population size (logged) †	-0.298** (0.122)	-3.45** (.861)
Democracy	0.113** (0.020)	0.014 (0.021)
GDP Per Capita (logged) †	0.012 (0.098)	-0.808 (0.472)
British Colony	-0.001 (0.263)	0.397 (0.256)
Leftist regime	-0.852 (0.437)	-0.663 (0.465)
Civil war	0.279 (0.487)	0.008 (0.325)
International war	-1.11* (0.505)	0.485 (0.517)
Log likelihood	-160.01	-180.27
$\chi^2$	107.66	60.97
Probability > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.252	0.145
(N)	98	97

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years. \*p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

**Table 5.** Model 2 - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI empowerment human rights index scores in 1998.

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Independent variables- levels (1988)</b>	<b>Independent variables-change (from 1988 to 1998)</b>
HRO membership (square root)	0.562** (0.138)	0.182* (0.086)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.132 (0.230)	-0.0004 (0.004)
Population size (logged) †	-0.521** (0.117)	-3.54** (1.01)



Democracy	0.073** (0.022)	0.041 (0.022)	
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Table 5. Contd.

Independent variables	Independent variables- levels (1988)	Independent variables-change (from 1988 to 1998)
GDP per capita (logged) †	-0.188 (0.103)	-0.278 (0.454)
British colony	-0.575* (0.242)	-0.287 (0.236)
Leftist regime	0.657 (0.388)	-0.835* (0.375)
Civil War	-0.140 (0.311)	-0.473 (0.375)
International war	0.091 (0.858)	0.339 (0.472)
Log likelihood	--189.61	-199.49
$\chi^2$	80.41	45.67
Probability > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.175	0.103
(N)	106	103

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years. \*p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

Table 6. Models 3 and 4 - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on  $\Delta$ CIRI empowerment human rights index scores.

Independent variables	Model 3† ( $\Delta$ HR index score from 1981 to 1991)‡	Model 4† ( $\Delta$ HR index score from 1988 to 1998)
HRO membership (square root)	0.260* (0.126)	0.168 (0.122)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.495 (0.268)	-0.232 (0.232)
Population size (logged)	-0.418** (0.117)	-2.81** (0.104)
Democracy	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.020)
GDP per capita (logged)	-0.140 (0.097)	-0.135 (0.095)
British colony	-0.493 (0.260)	-0.745** (0.232)
Leftist regime	0.109 (0.417)	0.928* (0.375)

Civil war	0.835 (0.486)	-0.068 (0.305)
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Table 6. Contd.

Independent variables	Model 3† (Δ HR index score from 1981 to 1991)‡	Model 4† (Δ HR index score from 1988 to 1998)
International war	-0.563 (0.481)	0.478 (0.478)
Log Likelihood	-212.27	-235.23
$\chi^2$	22.24	31.79
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.01	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.06
(N)	94	106

† Model 3 independent variables are at their levels in 1978; Model 4 independent variables are at their levels in 1988. ‡ CIRI Human Rights Index begins in 1981. \*p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

variables with large scale differences were logged in an attempt to deal with any heteroskedasticity problems.<sup>9</sup>

In all models, the Population Size control is statistically significant, with a negative coefficient. This is consistent with previous research that concludes that states with larger populations are more likely to have human rights abuses (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999). Other statistically significant control variables include Democracy (Model 1-level, Model 2-level), British Colony (Model 2-levels, Model 4), Leftist Regime (Model 2-change, Model 4), and International War (Model 1-levels). As to the key independent variable, HRO membership, the ordered probit estimates are statistically significant at (at least) P < 0.05 (two tailed) level in Model 1-levels, Model 1-change, Model 2-levels, Model 2-change, and Model 3. The coefficients are all positive, indicating support for the hypothesis that an increase in HRO memberships correlates with an increase in CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores.

Though these models all fit the  $\chi^2$  of goodness of fit to the population at Prob >  $\chi^2$  of 0.01 or below, the Pseudo R<sup>2</sup> s are all extremely low (from 0.25 to 0.05), indicating that very little of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the included independent variables. The substantive impact can be observed in Figures 4 - 7. Each graph shows the impact on the odds of full government respect for empowerment rights (CIRI Empowerment Index score of 10) as the values of each of the statistically significant independent variables moves from its minimum value to its maximum value in Models 1 and 2.<sup>10</sup> The most interesting finding from this model is that the largest impact on increasing the odds of full government respect for empowerment rights is the

key independent variable. Also, because of the issues of multicollinearity in some of the models, it is reassuring to see these findings in the models without multicollinearity problems, namely Model 1-change and Model 2-change.

### Sensitivity tests

Two different sensitivity tests were performed. The results of these sensitivity tests indicate that further data collection and testing might be necessary in order to provide strong support for the hypothesis. However, the sensitivity tests confirm that findings from the base model.


First, in order to contend that the significance of HRO memberships was not simply due to an overall growth in civil society within each country, a control for overall international NGO citizen memberships within each state was added. The level of the overall international NGO memberships within a state has been gathered by Dr. Todd Landman, using the Yearbook of International Organizations, for his 2005 book *Protecting Human Rights: A Comparative Study*. In order to avoid recording HROs twice, the HRO data was first subtracted out and then, the natural log of the remaining Figures 8, 9 and 10 was taken. Tables 7 - 9 provide the ordered probit estimates with the addition of Landman (2005)'s measure of INGO memberships within a state. The key independent variable in Model 1-levels and Model 1-change remains statistically significant with a positive coefficient at the p < 0.01 (two tailed test) level. Although Model 2-level remains statistically significant, Model 2-change is no longer statistically significant with the addition of Landman (2005)'s measure of overall INGO membership within each state. Additionally, Model 3 is also no longer statistically significant with the addition of Landman (2005)'s measure. Interestingly, Landman (2005)'s measure is not statistically significant in these models. Somewhat surprisingly, Landman (2005)'s measure is not

<sup>9</sup> I also ran OLS regression and then used the command "hettest" in STATA 9, where I couldn't reject the null of homoskedasticity. Additionally, residual plots were created against the past (10 years prior) residuals and were not indicative of autocorrelation.


<sup>10</sup> These figures were created using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

highly correlated with the key independent variable and multicollinearity problems do not increase with the addition of this variable.


For the second set of sensitivity tests, a measure for foreign direct investment (natural log), following the procedure of Richards, Gelleny and Sacko (2001) was added. Tables 10 - 12 provide these results. The most fundamental  
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
**Figure 4.** Greatest possible impact on the Odds of Full Government Respect for Empowerment Rights. Model 1 - independent variables measured as levels - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores in 1988.



**Figure 5.** Greatest possible impact on the odds of full government respect for Empowerment Rights. Model 1 - independent variables measured as change - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores in 1988.



**Figure 6.** Greatest Possible impact on the odds of full government respect for Empowerment Rights. Model 2 - independent variables measured as levels - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores in 1998.




**Figure 7.** Greatest possible impact on the odds of full government respect for Empowerment Rights. Model 2 - independent variables measured as change - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores in 1998.

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**Figure 8.** CIRI Empowerment Index score distributions by region – 1981.



434 **Figure 9.** CIRI Empowerment Index Score Distributions by Region – 1988.  
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**Figure 10.** CIRI Empowerment Index Score Distributions by Region – 1998.

**Table 7.** Robustness test – add in Landman (2005)'s measure of INGOS Model 1 - ordered Probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights index scores in 1988.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1978)	Independent variables-change(from 1978 to 1988)
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HRO Membership (square root)	0.564** (0.140)	0.426** (0.131)
Trade Openness (logged)	-0.145 (0.272)	0.008 (0.008)
Population Size (logged)†	-0.291* (0.126)	-3.76** (0.902)
Democracy	0.118** (0.022)	0.017 (0.022)
GDP Per Capita (logged) †	-0.034 (0.108)	-0.738 (0.128)
British Colony	-0.098 (0.276)	0.317 (0.266)
Leftist Regime	-0.837 (0.440)	-0.666 (0.472)
Civil War	0.345 (0.495)	0.025 (0.330)
International War	-1.13 (0.509)	0.494 (0.520)

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Table 7. Contd.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1978)	Independent variables-change(from 1978 to 1988)
INGO memberships (logged)	0.063 (0.071)	0.080 (0.138)
Log likelihood	-151.17	-169.01
$\chi^2$	101.40	59.66
Probability > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.251	0.150
(N)	93	92

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years. \*p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

Table 8a. Robustness test – add in Landman (2005)'s measure of INGOS Model 2 - ordered Probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights index scores in 1998.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1988)	Independent variables-change ( from 1988 to 1998)
HRO membership (square root)	0.527** (0.139)	0.118 (0.101)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.116 (0.231)	0.00008 (0.004)
Population size (logged)†	-0.536** (0.119)	-4.11** (1.15)

Democracy	.080** (0.023)	0.052* (0.023)
GDP per capita (logged) †	-0.239* (.031)	-0.042 (0.473)
British colony	-0.545* (0.250)	-0.351 (.254)
Leftist regime	0.769 (0.405)	-0.900* (.378)
Civil War	-0.224 (0.315)	-0.497 (0.382)
International war	-0.0002 (0.508)	.251 (.489)
INGO memberships (logged)	0.112 (.099)	-0.070 (.537)
Log likelihood	-177.01	-185.69
$\chi^2$	75.92	43.64
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.177	0.105
(N)	100	97

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years. \*p < 0.05 \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).  
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**Table 8b.** Robustness Test – Add in Landman (2005)'s Measure of INGOS Model 2 - Ordered Probit Estimating the Effect of HRO Memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index Scores in 1998

<b>Independent variables</b>	<b>Independent variables-levels (1988)</b>	<b>Independent variables-change (from 1988 to 1998)</b>
HRO membership (square root)	0.527** (0.139)	0.118 (0.101)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.116 (0.231)	0.00008 (0.004)
Population size (logged)†	-0.536** (0.119)	-4.11** (1.15)
Democracy	.080** (0.023)	0.052* (0.023)
GDP Per Capita (logged) †	-0.239* (.031)	-0.042 (0.473)
British colony	-0.545* (0.250)	-0.351 (.254)
Leftist regime	0.769 (0.405)	-0.900* .378
Civil war	-0.224	-0.497



	(0.315)	(0.382)
International war	-0.0002 (0.508)	.251 (.489)
INGO Memberships (logged)	0.112 (.099)	-0.070 (.537)
Log likelihood	-177.01	-185.69
$\chi^2$	75.92	43.64
Probability > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.177	0.105
(N)	100	97

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years. \*p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

**Table 9.** Robustness test – add in Landman (2005)'s measure of INGOS. Models 3 and 4 - ordered Probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on  $\Delta$ CIRI Empowerment Human rights Index scores.

<b>Independent Variables</b>	<b>Model 3† (<math>\Delta</math> HR index score from 1981 to 1991)‡</b>	<b>Model 4† (<math>\Delta</math> HR index score from 1988 to 1998)</b>
HRO membership (square root)	0.222 (0.129)	0.154 (0.123)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.450 (0.272)	-0.248 (0.220)
Population size (logged)	-0.399** (0.120)	-0.313** (0.106)

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**Table 9.** Contd.

<b>Independent variables</b>	<b>Model 3† (<math>\Delta</math> HR index score from 1981 to 1991)‡</b>	<b>Model 4† (<math>\Delta</math> HR index score from 1988 to 1998)</b>
Democracy	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.022)
GDP per capita (logged)	-.082 (0.105)	-0.147 (0.101)
British colony	-0.486 (0.275)	-0.683** (0.240)
Leftist regime	0.136 (0.420)	1.02** (0.390)
Civil War	0.930 (0.495)	-0.105 (.309)
International War	-0.655 (0.486)	0.437 (0.481)
INGO memberships (logged)	0.086 (0.067)	0.065 (0.091)
Log likelihood	-199.32	-221.02
$\chi^2$	22.58	32.22

Prob > $\chi^2$	0.01	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.07
(N)	89	100

† Model 3 independent variables are at their levels in 1978; Model 4 independent variables are at their levels in 1988; ‡ CIRI Human Rights Index begins in 1981; \*p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

**Table 10.** Robustness test – add in Foreign Direct Investments-Richards et al (2001). Model 1 - Ordered Probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores in 1988.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1978)	Independent variable-change(from 1978 to 1988)
HRO Membership (square root)	0.515** (0.181)	0.570** (0.215)
Trade Openness (logged)	-0.408 (0.390)	0.007 (0.010)
Population size (logged)†	-0.291 (0.197)	-2.55 1.55
Democracy	0.145** (0.028)	0.286 (0.028)
GDP per capita (logged) †	0.044 (0.204)	-0.564 (0.703)
British colony	0.290 (0.484)	0.603 (0.396)
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**Table 10.** Contd.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1978)	Independent variable-change(from 1978 to 1988)
Leftist Regime	-0.016 (0.683)	-1.12 (0.857)
Civil War	0.528 (0.590)	0.718 (0.505)
International War	0.003 (0.674)	0.803 (0.648)
INGO Memberships (logged)	0.168 (0.087)	0.047 (0.166)
Foreign Direct Investment (logged)	0.105 (0.134)	-0.011 (0.128)
Log likelihood	-97.89	-89.04
$\chi^2$	72.10	29.56
Probability > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.27	0.15
(N)	63	50

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years ; \*p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

**Table 11.** Robustness Test - Add in Foreign Direct Investments-Richards et al (2001). Model 2 - Ordered Probit Estimating the Effect of HRO Memberships on CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index Scores in 1998.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1988)	Independent variables-change (from 1988 to 1998)
HRO Membership (square root)	.478* (.195)	-0.0009 (.193)
Trade Openness (logged)	-.609* (.309)	.004 (.007)
Population Size (logged)†	-.767** (.216)	-2.90 (2.39)
Democracy	.094** (.029)	.074 (.039)
GDP Per Capita (logged) †	-.433 (.229)	-.213 (.682)
British Colony	-.527 (.314)	-.338 (.379)
Leftist Regime	.132 (.618)	-1.57 (.721)
Civil War	.355 (.453)	-.948 (.639)
International war	1.64 (1.12)	.794 (1.31)
INGO memberships (logged)	.150 (.122)	-.111 (.662)
Foreign direct investment (logged)	.162 (.119)	.053 (.115)

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**Table 11.** Contd.

Independent variables	Independent variables-levels (1988)	Independent variables-change (from 1988 to 1998)
Log likelihood	-112.72	-88.67
$\chi^2$	55.07	15.41
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.00	0.16
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.08
(N)	65	45

† Population change and GDP per capita change are both measured as percent increase for past 10 years; \*p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

**Table 12.** Robustness test – add in Foreign Direct Investments-Richards et al (2001). Models 3 and 4 - ordered probit estimating the effect of HRO memberships on  $\Delta$ CIRI Empowerment Human Rights Index scores.

Independent variables	Model 3† ( $\Delta$ HR Index score from 1981 to 1991)‡	Model 4† ( $\Delta$ HR Index score from 1988 to 1998)
HRO membership (square root)	0.187 (0.170)	0.151 (0.181)
Trade openness (logged)	-0.780* (0.351)	-0.996** (0.304)
Population size (logged)†	-0.319 (0.184)	-0.800** (0.208)
Democracy	-0.023 (0.023)	-0.022 (0.027)
GDP per capita (logged) †	0.008 (0.203)	-0.519* (0.220)

British colony	-0.276 (0.372)	-0.682* (0.305)
Leftist regime	0.424 (0.665)	1.09 0.615
Civil war	1.20* (0.588)	0.783 (.435)
International war	-1.35* (0.670)	4.28** (1.18)
INGO memberships (logged)	0.044 (0.081)	0.080 (0.115)
Foreign Direct Investment (logged)	-0.106 (0.132)	0.336** (.117)
Log likelihood	-135.61	-133.01
$\chi^2$	20.29	35.32
Prob > $\chi^2$	0.04	0.00
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.12
(N)	61	65

† Model 3 independent variables are at their levels in 1978; Model 4 independent variables are at their levels in 1988; ‡ CIRI Human Rights Index begins in 1981; \*p < 0.05; \*\* p < 0.01 (two tailed tests).

change with the addition of this variable is that Model 2-change no longer has a Prob >  $\chi^2$  of less than 0.05. The key independent variable remains statistically significant in significant in Model 1-change and Model 1-levels and Model 2-change but is not statistically significant in Model 3 or 4. Also, somewhat surprisingly, the measure of foreign direct investment (natural log) was not correlated with trade openness and did not increase multicollinearity problems.

## IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS TO THEORY

Do HROs make a difference? This quantitative analysis  
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provides moderate support for the ability of HROs to impact human rights performance. Many of the original models did indicate statistically significant results for the measure of HRO membership within a state.

On a whole, though this research might be a necessary first step in developing a large-N study of the impact of HRO activity on improvements in human rights performance, it is perhaps nothing more than a baby step. First, it is important to remember that this data only focused on three specific years: 1978, 1988, and 1998 and was thus impacted by the state of the world in these years. It would be interesting to repeat the research using three year averages around each date instead of simply 1978, 1988, and 1998. Likewise, there is reason to question Tsutsui and Min Wotipka (2004)'s coding procedure for the data used as the dependent variable. Tsutsui and Min Wotipka (2004) used a search off of the Yearbook for International Organization's CD-ROM that does not actually code as human rights organizations but codes at different subject headings. In fact, when their coding procedure was repeated, it produces a list of

HROs which was in no way similar to the list of HROs with Consultative Status with UN ECOSOC. Though it is not mentioned in the literature, one of the key factors for the scarcity of quantitative publications concerning the impact of HROs is the absence of readily accessible data on HROs. The Yearbook of International Organizations, though quite thorough, is difficult to navigate and extremely time-consuming to code. After correspondence with Landman and the head researcher for the Union of International Associations; the organization that publishes the Yearbook of International Organizations, this data, although an advance in the field, might take months of work to code. Further data collection is necessary in order to perhaps develop a longitudinal study of this hypothesis.

Finally, further research using more advanced systems of equations models and selection models seem necessary and could prove promising to the theoretical development of the HRO literature.

Despite these limitations, the findings of this large scale assessment provide baseline support for the political effects of human rights INGOs.

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